Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth?:An Assessment 20 Years after <em>Francovich</em> by Lock, Tobias
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth?
Citation for published version:
Lock, T 2012, 'Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth?: An Assessment 20 Years
after Francovich' Common Market Law Review, vol 49, no. 5, pp. 1675-1702.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Published In:
Common Market Law Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Lock, T. (2012). Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth?: An Assessment 20 Years
after Francovich. Common Market Law Review, 49(5), 1675-1702
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103490
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103490  
1 
Pre-edited version, accepted for publication in Common Market Law Review 2012 
 
Is private enforcement of EU law through state liability a myth? – An assessment 20 years after 
Francovich 
by Tobias Lock* 
 
I. Introduction 
It is a truism that the implementation of the law of the European Union (EU) chiefly occurs in a 
decentralised fashion by the authorities of the Member States.  The resulting potential for divergent 
interpretations and complete or partial failures to give full force to EU law in the Member States’ 
legal orders constitutes the main challenge to its uniform application and efficiency.  For this reason, 
the availability of effective enforcement mechanisms is crucial.  The Treaties only explicitly stipulate 
for public enforcement through the infringement proceedings provided for in Articles 258-260 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  Private means of enforcing EU law, such as 
the doctrine of direct effect or the rules on Member State liability for infringements of EU law, had 
to be developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).1  While public enforcement 
initiated by the European Commission or another Member State is usually motivated by a desire to 
ascertain the full application of European Union law, private enforcement by way of disputes 
brought by individual claimants to the Member State courts is usually privately motivated by a desire 
to obtain a remedy.  Nonetheless, the remedies developed by the CJEU, in particular Member State 
liability, which made its first appearance just over 20 years ago in Francovich2, are regarded as 
private enforcement mechanisms.  The argument is that remedies provided to private parties, who 
use them to pursue their own interests, act as a vehicle to achieve greater overall compliance with 
European Union law.  This is particularly evident from the CJEU’s reasoning in Francovich, which 
heavily relied on the argument that without Member State liability in case of a failure to transpose a 
Directive in time, the full effectiveness of European Union law would be impaired.3  In Brasserie du 
Pêcheur the Court additionally referred to the duty of cooperation laid down in Article 4 (3) TFEU4, 
which is a duty relating to the relationship between the Union and the Member States.  Thus by 
providing a route to obtain individual compensation and at the same time helping ensure the full 
effectiveness of EU law, Member State liability is given a dual purpose.5  Caranta went even so far to 
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1
 Starting with Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
2
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci, [1991] ECR I-5357. 
3
 Francovich, n. 2, para 33; Roberto Caranta, ‘Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New Jus Commune 
Takes Shape’, (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 703, 725; Fernand Schockweiler, ‘La responsabilité de 
l’autorité nationale en cas de violation du droit communautaire’ (1992) 28 Revue trimestrielle de droit 
européen 27, 42. 
4
 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, [1996] ECR I-1029, para 39. 
5
 Josephine Steiner, ‘From direct effects to Francovich: shifting means of enforcement of 
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suggest that individual judicial protection in such cases was ‘no more than an implication of the 
principle of full effects of [EU] law, as such to be used more to exact obedience from Member States 
than to protect citizens.’6  As is well-known, the Court in Brasserie du Pêcheur extended the remedy 
beyond the context of Directives to any sufficiently serious breach of EU law and first pronounced 
the still valid test for a state liability claim: the rule of EU law breached must be intended to confer 
rights upon individuals, there must be a sufficiently serious breach of that rule and a direct causal 
link between the breach and the damage sustained.7  In Köbler the CJEU later extended the doctrine 
of Member State liability to also cover breaches by the judiciary where the infringement of European 
Union law was manifest.8   
The introduction and expansion of the state liability remedy arguably helps to compensate 
for the weaknesses of public enforcement by the European Commission.  The criticism levied against 
the infringement procedure is well rehearsed so that it suffices to flag up the main points.  Although 
about half of all infringement procedures initiated by the European Commission in 2010 originated 
in complaints by individuals or companies9, the European Commission enjoys unlimited discretion as 
to which cases to bring before the CJEU10 enabling the Commission to pursue a policy of selective 
enforcement.11  This is coupled with a lack of transparency during the pre-litigation stage of 
infringement proceedings as regards access to documents, the non-disclosure of the Commission’s 
reasoned opinion or pleadings submitted to the Court of Justice.12  This has led the European 
Parliament to express its concern that the Commission’s alleged leniency would endanger the rule of 
law.13  Furthermore, the procedure has a reputation for being elitist rather than participatory even 
though improvements regarding the European Commission’s treatment of individual complaints 
have mitigated this.14  The effectiveness of infringement proceedings is considerably hampered in 
that they merely result in a declaratory judgment so that Member State will not necessarily 
discharge their duty under Article 260 (1) TFEU to remove the infringement.  Even the threat of 
pecuniary penalties, for the imposition of which the Commission can apply, does not guarantee 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Community law’, (1993) European Law Review 3, 11. 
6
 Caranta,n 3, 725. 
7
 Brasserie du Pêcheur, n. 4, para 4. 
8
 Case C-224/01 Köbler v Austria [2003] ECR I-10239, para 53. 
9
 European Commission, ‘28th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2010)’ COM(2011) 588 
final, 3. 
10
 Case 247/87 Star Fruit v Commission [1989] 291, para 11. 
11
 Richard Rawlings, ‘Engaged Elites Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in Commission Enforcement’, 
(2000) 6 European Law Journal 4, 10. 
12
 This lack of transparency was criticised by the European Parliament in its ‘Report on the 25th annual report 
from the Commission on monitoring the application of Community law (2007)’ A6-0245/2009, para 13 et seq. 
13
 European Parliament, ‘Report on the Commission's 21st and 22nd Annual reports on monitoring the 
application of Community law (2003 and 2004)’ A6-0089/2006, para 13; a similar criticism was voiced by 
Melanie Smith, ‘Enforcement, monitoring, verification, outsourcing: the decline and decline of the 
infringement process’, (2008) European Law Review 777. 
14
 Carol Harlow/Richard Rawlings, ‘Accountability and law enforcement: the centralised EU infringement 
procedure’, (2006) European Law Review 447. 
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compliance.15  In addition, public enforcement by the Member States under Article 259 TFEU is 
virtually never used.16   
While many of the weaknesses of the infringement procedure have been addressed over the 
years, private enforcement is still regarded as having the potential to function as a substantial 
complement to the infringement procedure.  The underlying rationale of this assumption has been 
pronounced by the CJEU very early on in Van Gend en Loos with regard to direct effect: 
 The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective 
supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by [Art. 258 and 259 TFEU] to the 
diligence of the Commission and the Member States.17 
Focussing on the cases decided in the twenty years following the Francovich decision, this article is 
an attempt to test the assumption that the remedy of Member State liability is a useful and welcome 
additional tool to enhance Member State compliance with their obligations under EU law.  For this 
purpose, the application of the law on Member State liability by the courts of England and Germany 
is scrutinised.  The first part of this article presents and examines statistical data which shows that 
only few cases have been successful so far.  The second part provides a detailed discussion as 
regards the grounds for the denial of such claims by both English and German courts and an 
assessment of the soundness of these decisions.  It will be shown that the suitability of Francovich 
claims as a means of private enforcement is overestimated and it is suggested to primarily regard 
the remedy as a means of compensating private parties for tort suffered. 
II. 20 years of Francovich: some statistical findings 
1. Method 
Before presenting the statistical findings on the treatment of the Francovich line of case law in 
English and German courts, it is necessary to establish on which methodical basis these findings 
were made.  In November 2011, the Francovich decision ‘celebrated’ its 20th anniversary.  This 
article is based on the developments during those twenty years.  Consequently, it only takes into 
account decisions handed down before the end of 2011.  The reason for choosing the jurisdictions of 
Germany and England for this exercise is that taken together both account for almost half of all 
references made to the CJEU in questions related to Member State liability.  By the end of 2011, the 
CJEU had decided 33 preliminary references involving questions of Member State liability.18  Seven 
                                                          
15
 Paul Craig/Grainne de Búrca, EU Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 414; Damian Chalmers/Gareth Davies/Giorgio 
Monti, European Union Law (2nd edn. CUP 2010) 345. 
16
 So far, there have only been four such cases: Case 141/78 France v United Kingdom [1979] ECR 2923; Case C-
388/95 Belgium v Spain [2000] ECR I-3123; Case C-145/05 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917; Case C-
364/10 Hungary v Slovakia (the case is still pending). 
17
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
18
 Francovich and Bonifaci, n 2: this decision gave rise to two follow-up references, which have not been 
counted separately: Joined Cases C-94/95 and 95/95 Bonifaci and Berto [1997] ECR I-3969 and Case C-373/95 
Maso [1997] ECR I-4051; Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, n. 4; Case C-392/93 British Telecom [1996] ECR 
I-1631; Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553; Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 
and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and others [1996] ECR I-4845; Joined cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 
Denkavit [1996] ECR I-5063; Case C-127/95 Norbrook Laboratories [1998] ECR I-1531; Case C-261/95 Palmisani 
[1997] ECR I-4025; Case C-319/96 Brinkmann [1998] ECR I-5255; C-140/97 Rechberger [1999] ECR I-3499; Case 
C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099; Case C-424/97 Haim [2000] ECR I-5123; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-
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of these originated in German courts19 and nine in English courts.20  In view of the size of the legal 
systems of England and Germany and on the basis of the large number of references originating 
there, one can assume that there is sufficient litigation in these countries allowing for conclusions to 
be drawn as regards the overall success of Member State liability under EU law.  A further reason for 
choosing these two jurisdictions was that both do not avail of a domestic system of state liability 
which would be able to deal with situations typically triggering Member State liability under EU law.  
English law does not have a separate state liability regime.  Rather, claimants are restricted to 
making claims based on ordinary torts, such as negligence, misfeasance in a public office or breach 
of a statutory duty.  There is no general principle that action ultra vires or invalid administrative acts 
alone give rise to a claim.21  Thus when it comes to the failure to comply with EU law obligations, the 
conditions for these torts will usually hard to satisfy. This is evident from the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Bourgoin S.A. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food which held that not every 
infringement of EU law constitutes a tort.22  Moreover, English law does not provide for a tort-based 
claim for violations brought about by the legislature.23  German tort law on the other hand provides 
for compensation where an official breaches an official duty.24  However, this is only the case where 
the duty breached is incumbent upon the state in relation to a third party.  This restriction has led 
the German courts to deny any claims based on legislative action since the legislature only ever acts 
in the interest of the public and not in the interest of individuals.25  Furthermore, German law 
contains a fault requirement, i.e. the official must have acted at intentionally or negligently.  As a 
result, the mere fact that an official has acted illegally does not suffice to establish a claim based on 
this tort.  In addition, there is an even more restricted liability of the state for violations by the 
judicial branch where a responsibility for judgments handed down only arises where the judge 
commits a criminal offence when handing down judgment.26  Thus both English and German law do 
not of themselves provide a claim in many cases where individuals are seeking reparation for 
damages resulting from breaches of European Union law.  This is because typical Francovich claims 
are based on legislative misconduct, e.g. problems with the implementation of directives or the 
adoption of legislation contrary to EU law.  Furthermore, they will often be unable to establish fault 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Hoechst [2001] ECR I-1727; Case C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark [2001] ECR I-
493; Case C-118/00 Larsy [2001] ECR I-5063; Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-14447; Köbler, n. 8; Case C-
222/02 Paul [2004] ECR I-9425; Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I-5177; Case C-470/03 
A.G.M.-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749; Case C-511/03 Ten Kate [2005] ECR I-8979; Case 446/04 Test Claimants in 
the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11753; Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation 
[2007] ECR I-2107; Case C-278/05 Robins [2007] ECR I-1053; Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier [2009] ECR I-
2119; Case C-452/06 Synthon [2008] ECR I-7681; Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos [2010] ECR I-635; Case C-
568/08 Combinatie Spijker Infrabrouw [2010] ECR I-00000; Case C-243/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I-00000; Case C-
279/09 DEB [2009] ECR I-00000; Case C-94/10 Danfoss [2011] ECR I-00000.  The cases of Francovich and 
Bonifaci and Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame were counted as two cases respectively because the 
references had been made by different courts. 
19
 Brasserie du Pêcheur, n. 4; Denkavit, Dillenkofer, Haim, Paul, Danske Slagterier, DEB, all n. 18. 
20
 Factortame n. 4, British Telecom, Hedley Lomas, Metallgesellschaft, Evans, Robins, Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, Synthon, all n. 18; the case of Norbrook 
originated in Northern Ireland and not in England so that it was not included here. 
21
 Paul Craig, Administrative Law (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 957. 
22
 Borgouin S. A. and Others v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] QB 716. 
23
 Steiner, n 5, 14. 
24
 § 839 BGB (German Civil Code). 
25
 Cf. the reference made by the Federal Court of Justice in Brasserie du Pêcheur, BGH III ZR 127/91. 
26
 § 839 (2) BGB. 
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as the legal situation may have been difficult so that an official’s illegal action may be excusable.  
Since neither German nor English law can accommodate these typical cases, one should expect 
ample litigation based on the EU law remedy.   
The sample consists of cases which either directly or indirectly decided over a claim of 
Member State liability.  Cases in which a court merely mentioned the possibility of such a claim in 
passing were not considered, e.g. where a court denied a claim based on an allegedly directly 
effective directive but mentioned that there might potentially be a claim against the state under 
Francovich.27  Likewise, cases in which a court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear a state liability 
case were not counted.28  The same is true for cases in which declarations were sought that there 
was a breach of EU law in order to prepare a Francovich claim.29  In contrast, cases concerning legal 
aid in view of a later Francovich claim were included since the courts are asked to make an 
assessment as to the chances of success such a claim might have.30   Decisions which were appealed 
have only been counted as one case (even though there may have been multiple decisions).  Where 
an appeal was pending at the end of 2011, the decision of the last court deciding was taken into 
consideration.  Cases are considered successful where Member State liability was actually 
established and damages had to be paid.   
2. Results 
a) Success rate in England 
In the 20 years following Francovich, 22 cases concerning Member State liability were decided by 
English courts.31  English courts made references to the CJEU in three further cases, for which no 
further decision by the domestic courts could be traced.32  These three cases have been added to the 
total number, resulting in 25 decisions overall.  Out of these 25 cases, seven resulted in convictions 
                                                          
27
 E.g. in Churchill Insurance Co Ltd v Wilkinson [2010] EWCA Civ 556. 
28
 E.g. in Mann v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [1998] Eu. L.R. 388. 
29
 E.g in R. v Secretary of State for Employment Ex p. Seymour-Smith (No.1) [1997] 1 W.L.R. 473; OVG 
Rheinland-Pfalz 6 A 11131/10; OVG Nordrhein-Westfalen 4 A 17/08. 
30
 E.g. KG Berlin 9 W 50/08; LG München 15 O 23548/08. 
31
 The total number of decisions is 35 (including decisions by lower courts, which were appealed); the (final) 
decisions are: Boyd Line Management Services Ltd v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (No.1) 
[1999] Eu. L.R. 44; FJ Chalke Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 952 (Ch); Byrne v Motor 
Insurers' Bureau [2008] EWCA Civ 574; Cooper v Attorney General [2010] EWCA Civ 464; Evans v Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWCA Civ 32; R. v Secretary of State for Transport 
Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.5) [2000] 1 A.C. 524; R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.6) 
[2001] 1 W.L.R. 942; R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Gallagher [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 951; 
Sayers v Cambridgeshire CC [2006] EWHC 2029 (QB); R. v Department of Social Security Ex p. Scullion [1999] 3 
C.M.L.R. 798; Spencer v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 750; Moore v Secretary of 
State for Work and Transport [2008] EWCA Civ 750; Phonographic Performance Ltd v Department of Trade and 
Industry [2004] EWHC 1795 (Ch); Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v Corporate Officer of the House of Commons 
67 Con. L.R. 1; Bowden v South West Water Services Ltd [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 330; R. (on the application of MK 
(Iran)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 115; R. (on the application of Negassi) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 386 (Admin); Three Rivers DC v Bank of England 
(No.3) [2003] 2 A.C. 1; Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] 
EWCA Civ 103; Test Claimants in Thin Cap Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] 
EWCA Civ 127; Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2007] 
UKHL 34; R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Lay and Gage [1998] C.O.D. 387.  
32
 These are Robins, Hedley Lomas and Synthon, all n 18. 
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by an English court.  The three further cases in which a reference had been made but where no 
further decision followed, were probably settled out of court.  In two of these, Hedley Lomas and 
Synthon, the CJEU had found a sufficiently serious breach33 so that they have been counted as 
successful.  In the remaining case of Robins, the establishment of a sufficiently serious breach was 
left to the referring court, but the CJEU had pointed to the ‘considerable discretion’ available to the 
Member State.34  Thus it is unlikely that this case would have been successful.  Fifteen of the 25 
cases dealt with the failure to either implement or apply a Directive properly,35 6 cases concerned 
violations of primary law36, three cases concerned Regulations37 and one case dealt with a Köbler 
claim38.  In four of the cases concerning Directives, Directive 84/5/EEC was at issue.39  The claimants 
in thirteen cases under review pursued commercial interests and most were companies; in twelve 
cases the claimants were individuals, of whom one was a representative of a pressure group.  In one 
of these twelve cases, one of about 400 claimants was a District Council.40   Overall, this results in a 
total of 9 successful cases out of a total of 25, which amounts to a success of 36%.   
b) Success rate in Germany 
During the same period German courts decided 34 cases directly or indirectly41 based on the 
Francovich line of case law.42  In addition, there are three cases in which German courts made a 
reference but where no further decision can be traced.  This raises the total number of cases to 37.  
One of these cases is Fuß43, in which the national proceedings were still pending by the end of 2011 
before the Halle Administrative Court.44  But from other decisions based on Fuß, which were 
successful,45 one can infer that Fuß itself was also a successful case.  The two other references, 
Denkavit and Haim, are considered unsuccessful. In Denkavit46 the CJEU did not find a sufficiently 
serious breach so that it can be assumed that the case was not pursued any further.  In Haim the 
CJEU held that the relevant breach of EU law occurred at a time when the situation had not yet been 
elucidated by the Court.47  Despite leaving the final decision on this point to the referring court, this 
                                                          
33
 Hedley Lomas and Synthon, both n 18. 
34
 Robins, n 18, para 74. 
35
 Chalke; Byrne; Evans; Gallagher; Sayers; Scullion; Spencer; Moore; Phonographic; Bowden; Negassi; Three 
Rivers, all n 31; Hedley Lomas; Robins and Synthon, all n 18. 
36
 Factortame No. 5; Factortame No. 6; Harmon; Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation; Test Claimants in 
Thin Cap Group Litigation; Sempra, all n 31. 
37
 Boyd; MK; Lay and Gage, all n 31. 
38
 Cooper, n 31. 
39
 Byrne; Evans; Spencer; Moore, all n 31. 
40
 Three Rivers DC, n 31. 
41
 E.g. legal aid proceedings. 
42
 OLG Frankfurt, 1 U 244/07; LG Berlin 23 O 44/08; BGH III ZR 140/09; LG Berlin 23 O 503/07; BGH III ZR 48/01; 
LG Bonn 1 O 186/98; LG Bonn 1 O 5/99; BGH III ZR 233/07; BGH III ZR 294/03; KG Berlin 9 W 50/08; LG 
München 15 O 23548/08; BGH III ZR 144/05; BGH IX ZR 210/10; LG Bonn 1 O 320/93 (settled out of court); OLG 
Köln 7 U 23/97; BGH III ZR 127/91; BGH III ZR 358/03; LG Düsseldorf 2b O 286/08; BGH III ZR 4/05; KG Berlin 9 
U 10/08; LG Bonn 1 O 364/98; OLG Karlsruhe 12 U 286/05; BGH III ZR 337/09; OVG Berlin-Brandenburg 4 B 
13/11; OVG Hamburg 9 Bf 90/08; LG Hannover 14 O 57/10; OLG München 1 U 5279/10; OLG München 1 U 
392/11; LG Bochum 5 O 5/11; LG Köln 5 O 385/10; KG Berlin 9 U 233/10; BGH III ZR 59/10; BVerwG 2 B 93/11; 
OLG Düsseldorf 18 U 111/10. 
43
 Fuß, n 18. 
44
 VG Halle, 5 A 180/10 HAL. 
45
 Fuß, n 18. 
46
 Denkavit, n 18. 
47
 Haim, n 18, para 47. 
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was a strong indicator that the breach was not serious, so that it is unlikely that the claim was 
successful or successfully settled.  Out of this total of 37 cases, eight resulted in convictions or in 
settlements out of court.48   
23 of the German cases concerned Directives49, nine cases concerned primary law50 and 
three cases were Köbler claims51.  Of all claimants, seventeen were companies and twenty-two were 
individuals, some of whom pursued commercial interests.  As in England, German courts had to deal 
with a number of repeat claims concerning the same alleged breach.  Five unsuccessful claims 
concerned the German ban on bets on sporting competitions.52  The CJEU’s judgment in Fuß 
triggered a number of follow-up cases of firemen requesting compensation for time worked in 
excess of the limits laid down in the Working Time Directive.53  Thus in Germany there was a success 
rate of 22%.  The main findings are summarised in the following tables. 
Table 1: Success rate of state liability proceedings 1992-2011 
Cases brought in Overall number Successful Success rate 
England 25 7 36% 
Germany 37 8 22% 
 
Table 2: Alleged violations (percentage of total) 
Cases brought in Directives Primary law Regulations Köbler 
England 15 (60%) 6 (24%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 
Germany 25 (68%) 9 (24%) 0  3 (8%) 
 
Apart from the low overall number of state liability cases over the last twenty years, it is noteworthy 
that in both countries the vast majority of cases dealt with issues surrounding the transposition of 
Directives.  Late transposition in particular was also identified by the European Commission as one of 
the key problems when it comes to the compliance with EU law.54  The Directive is thus the 
legislative instrument that is most likely to lead to litigation.  It will be shown in the second part of 
                                                          
48
 Notably, following the case of Dillenkofer, about 7800 individual claims were settled by the Federal German 
government, cf. the answer given by the Federal Government in the Bundestag, Deutscher Bundestag 
Plenarprotokoll of 16 October 1996, 13. Wahlperiode, 130. Sitzung.   
49
 LG Berlin 23 O 44/08; BGH III ZR 140/09; LG Berlin 23 O 503/07; BGH III ZR 48/01; LG Bonn 1 O 186/98; LG 
Bonn 1 O 5/99; BGH III ZR 233/07; BGH III ZR 294/03; KG Berlin 9 W 50/08; BGH III ZR 144/05; BGH IX ZR 
210/10; LG Bonn 1 O 320/93 (settled out of court); OLG Köln 7 U 23/97; BGH III ZR 358/03; LG Düsseldorf 2b O 
286/08; BGH III ZR 4/05; KG Berlin 9 U 10/08; LG Bonn 1 O 364/98; BGH III ZR 337/09; OVG Berlin-Brandenburg 
4 B 13/11; OVG Hamburg 9 Bf 90/08; KG Berlin 9 U 233/10; BGH III ZR 59/10; BVerwG 2 B 93/11; Denkavit, 
n 18; Fuß n 18. 
50
 LG München 15 O 23548/08; BGH III ZR 127/91; LG Hannover 14 O 57/10; OLG München 1 U 5279/10; OLG 
München 1 U 392/11; LG Bochum 5 O 5/11; LG Köln 5 O 385/10; OLG Düsseldorf 18 U 111/10; Haim, n 18. 
51
 OLG Frankfurt, 1 U 244/07; BGH III ZR 294/03; OLG Karlsruhe 12 U 286/05. 
52
 LG Hannover , 14 O 57/10; OLG München 1 U 5279/10 and 1 U 392/11; LG Bochum 5 O 5/11; LG Köln, 5 O 
385/10. 
53
 OVG Berlin-Brandenburg, 4 B 13/11; OVG Hamburg9 Bf 90/08; it is likely that more cases are still pending 
and that a large number of cases have been settled out of court, cf. the press release by the trade union ver.di, 
which suggests that there are thousands of claims pending: <http://gemeinden.bb.verdi.de/berlin_-
_fb_7/copy_of_fachgruppe_5_-_feuerwehr/data/Feuerwehreinsatz-gegen-Mehrarbeit.pdf> accessed 29 April 
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this article that national courts are only willing to award damages in cases concerning Directives 
where the violation was clear, which reduces the suitability of the Francovich claim for private 
enforcement. 
3. Contrast: infringements proceedings 
Before analysing the results just presented, it is worthwhile contrasting these numbers with 
infringement proceedings brought by the European Commission under Article 258 TFEU.  In 2010 the 
European Commission initiated 1289 new infringement cases55 while it was dealing with almost 2100 
active cases at the end of that year.56  Of the newly detected cases, 31 concerned Germany and 75 
concerned the United Kingdom.57  Of the overall number of cases under examination in 2010, 104 
concerned Germany and 110 concerned the United Kingdom.58  Even though more cases overall 
were initiated against the United Kingdom, only one was subsequently referred to the CJEU in 2010 
whereas seven were referred against Germany.59  This suggests that the United Kingdom cooperates 
better with the European Commission in removing the infringements at the pre-litigation stage.  This 
may help explain why the United Kingdom has been the subject of infringement proceedings the 
Court of Justice to a much lesser extent than Germany.   
During the period from 1992 until 2010, 97 litigious cases were brought against the United 
Kingdom and 200 against Germany.60  The success rate of such proceedings is high.  In the nine-year 
period between 2002 and 2010, for which statistics are available on the CJEU’s website61, 59 
judgments were rendered against the United Kingdom.  Only 13 of them were dismissed, resulting in 
a success rate of 78% of cases.  76 judgments were rendered in cases brought against Germany, of 
which only nine were dismissed, resulting in a success rate of 88%.  Before entering into a deeper 
analysis of these statistics, the sheer contrast in numbers stands out.  There was far more public 
enforcement litigation against the United Kingdom and Germany than Francovich cases.  The success 
rate of the former was considerably higher.   
Table 3: comparison of proceedings (1992-2011)  
Cases brought against Under Art 258 (success rate)62 State Liability (success rate) 
Germany 200 (88%) 38 (21%) 
United Kingdom 97 (78%) 25 (36%)63 
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When looking at these figures, one needs to be aware that only a small fraction of infringement 
proceedings initiated by the European Commission actually result in proceedings before the CJEU.  In 
most cases, the infringement is removed before the case reaches the Court.  
Table 4: Infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission 2006-201064 
Cases brought against Formal notice Reasoned Opinion Referral to CJEU 
Germany 236 98 47 
United Kingdom 304 109 26 
 
Of course, these statistics do not reveal why the cases were resolved before they had reached the 
stage of being referred to the CJEU.  One explanation would be that the Member States managed to 
convince the Commission that there was no infringement after all.  However, this seems unlikely.  
The more probable explanation is that the Member States removed the infringement.  This is 
particularly likely because most proceedings are initiated because of failures to communicate the 
transposition of Directives65, which in itself constitutes an infringement.66 
The main question for this paper is, of course, in how far Francovich is likely to have 
contributed to the enforcement of European Union law.  In view of the statistics presented, the 
number of infringement proceedings in the Court of Justice was almost five times greater than that 
of Francovich cases decided in the domestic courts.67  If one also takes into account the much larger 
number of infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission, which were not referred to the 
Court, the number of state liability cases is dwarfed.  This would suggest that in the overall picture of 
enforcement, Francovich type cases are only of limited importance.  One caveat has to be added, 
however.  The number of cases settled outside court is unclear.  It is very likely that such settlements 
have occurred in the past.  This is for instance evidenced by the events following the CJEU’s 
Dillenkofer decision68, when about 7,800 individuals were paid compensation totalling about 10 
million Euro.69  As already indicated, it is highly likely that some of the references made by English or 
German courts, where there has been no follow-up decision by the referring domestic court, 
resulted in settlements.  The number of cases which have left no trace in publicly accessible 
databases remains unknown.  For a government, the incentive to agree to such a settlement is great 
where it sees itself losing the case.  It may avoid a judgment from being published and thereby 
prevent copy-cat claims.  Furthermore, it may save on legal costs and a quick out-of court settlement 
may incentivise the claimant to accept a smaller sum than the actual damage sustained.  As will be 
shown in the next part of this contribution, the criteria for a state liability claim are very difficult to 
establish.  In view of this and the resulting low success rate of such claims compared with the 
success rate of proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, it is usually worth for the government running 
the risk of proceedings.  Thus it is at least unlikely that the total number of cases settled exceeds the 
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number of overall judgments in these matters.  For this reason, one can conclude that the coffers of 
the Member States’ treasuries have not been opened, as was feared by early commentators.70  
Another concern, which had been voiced by Harlow amongst others, is that the claim for state 
liability might primarily benefit corporations and other claimants with a commercial interest.71  The 
numbers have revealed that only in about half of the cases, the claimants pursued commercial 
interests. 
III. Analysis of German and English cases  
As shown in the preceding section, actions for Member State liability initiated in Germany and 
England are usually unsuccessful.  It is thus apposite to examine why this is the case, in particular 
whether the conditions for state liability are applied in the same manner in both countries and 
whether any patterns of avoidance can be found.  In order to enable such analysis, it is necessary to 
establish the ground rules.  As mentioned in the introduction, a claim for Member State liability 
must satisfy three conditions: the rule infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals, the 
breach must be sufficiently serious and there must be a causal link between the breach and the 
damage.72  As is shown in the following table, the vast majority of claims fail because the national 
court was unable to establish a sufficiently serious breach. 
Table 5: Reasons why claims failed in court 
 Total no. of 
unsuccessful 
cases  
Lack of rule 
conferring 
rights on 
individuals 
No sufficiently 
serious breach 
No causal link Procedural 
hurdle/no 
damage/unclear  
England 16 1 (6%) 10 (63%) 1 (6%) 4 (25%) 
Germany73 30 3 (10%) 17 (57%) 7 (23%) 3 (10%) 
 
It will be shown that the criteria developed by the CJEU and applied by the national courts are not 
suited to foster compliance with the law of the European Union.  Member State liability should thus 
be chiefly regarded as a remedy for individuals whose rights under EU law have been gravely 
disregarded by the Member States and not as a valuable tool for the private enforcement of 
European rules.   
1. Rule conferring rights on individuals 
The finding of whether the rule concerned confers rights on individuals is naturally a matter of 
interpreting European Union law.  The Court of Justice has so far not provided a comprehensive 
theory of rights in EU law.74  As a consequence, the Court’s approach when reaching its findings 
differs slightly from case to case.  In Fuß the Court invoked an explicit reference to the safety and 
health of workers in Art 6 (b) of the Working Time Directive 2003/88 to conclude that the minimum 
                                                          
70
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requirements contained therein conferred rights on workers.75  But explicit reference to the 
individual in the wording of a provision is not always necessary but can be sufficient. In Brasserie the 
Court held it to be manifest that Article 34 TFEU, which contains a prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect, is nonetheless capable of being intended to 
confer rights on individuals.76  This can be contrasted with Ten Kate Holding where it relied on a 
literal approach to conclude that Article 265 TFEU did not impose an obligation on a Member State 
to initiate proceedings against an EU institution for failures to act.77  The Court also held that Art. 4 
(3) TFEU did not confer individual rights against a Member State since it only contained mutual 
duties between the Member States and EU institutions.78  This argument was less clearly based on a 
literal interpretation but also pointed to earlier case law where this had been established.  But not in 
all cases is the requirement fulfilled in such a manifest way.  It is clear from Paul that the CJEU is 
prepared to conduct a much deeper analysis.  The Court was asked to decide whether certain 
Directives gave rights to depositors to a proper supervision of banks.  The Court employed three 
methods of interpretation.  First, it adopted a literal approach holding that the Directives do not 
expressly grant such a right to depositors.79  Second, it employed a systematic argument by referring 
to the limits of the EU’s competence under Article 64 (2) TFEU to adopt harmonising measures on 
the movement of capital.  Only measures which were necessary could be adopted.  Given that an 
individual right to effective supervision was not strictly necessary to achieve the objective of the 
Directives, such a right was held not to be conferred by them.80  Third, the Court considered the 
purpose of the provisions by stating that the Directives only laid down a minimal protection for 
depositors, which would also be guaranteed where supervision was defective.81  It followed that a 
right to supervision was not necessary.  This reasoning in Paul shows that the first condition for the 
state liability claim is not always easy to determine and that national courts need to employ the full 
canon of interpretative methods in order to decide on this point.  The following discussion of two 
cases from Germany and one from England will show that there are considerable variations in the 
quality of national court decisions on the matter.   
In cases related to the Paul proceedings the Landgericht (Regional Court) Bonn adopted a sound 
and convincing approach and concluded that Article 7 of Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee-
schemes82 conferred rights on individual depositors.83  The Landgericht pointed in particular to the 
right of compensation for individuals explicitly provided for in the Directive.  It rejected a 
competence-based argument by the German state, which pointed to the fact that the Directive was 
not based on the EU’s competences in the field of consumer protection in what are now Articles 115 
and 169 TFEU84, but rather on Article 60 TFEU.  It held that the Directive’s legal basis in Article 60 (2) 
TFEU does not necessarily mean that the Directive does not pursue other goals, such as the 
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protection of individuals, as well.  The Court pointed in particular to the recitals of the Directive, 
which explicitly refer to consumer protection.   
The Landgericht’s reasoning is evidence of a sound understanding of the relevant legal 
principles.  Yet there are cases where a similar degree of understanding appeared to be lacking.  An 
example is a case decided by the Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court) Berlin on whether 
Article 13 (B) (f) of the Sixth VAT Directive 77/388/EEC conferred rights on individuals.85  This 
provision states that ‘betting, lotteries and other forms of gambling’ are exempt from VAT subject to 
limitations laid down by each Member State.  The CJEU had previously held that Germany was in 
violation of that Directive as it had exempted public casinos from VAT whereas privately owned 
casinos were subject to VAT.86  In subsequent state liability proceedings, the Kammergericht held 
that the provision did not confer rights on individuals but aimed to accomplish neutral taxation.  
Interestingly, this conclusion was reached despite the fact that the CJEU had previously held the 
provision to be directly effective.87  The question whether it is a condition for the direct effect of a 
Directive that a provision to confer rights on individuals was long the subject of academic debate.88  
Prechal has convincingly argued that a provision can be directly effective without conferring rights.89  
At the same time she concedes that the direct effect of a provision usually indicates that there is a 
right conferred upon individuals.90  What is remarkable about the Kammergericht’s decision is that in 
its decision on the very point the CJEU had explicitly stated that individuals can rely on provisions ‘in 
so far as they define rights which individuals are able to assert against the state’.91  There was thus a 
strong indication from the CJEU that the provision in question was intended to confer rights on 
individuals.  The fact that the Kammergericht’s swiftly dismissed the arguments advanced by the 
claimant at least suggests a general unwillingness on part of the court to grant damages if not a mis-
application of the CJEU’s ruling.   
The requirement that a provision of EU law must confer rights on individuals also featured 
prominently in the English Three Rivers litigation.  The plaintiffs claimed that the Bank of England 
had failed to comply with its supervisory duties under the First Banking Directive 77/780/EEC92 as a 
result of which the plaintiffs lost their deposits in a fraudulent bank.  The plaintiffs failed to convince 
the courts at all instances that the Directive was intended to confer rights on individuals.  Lord Hope, 
who gave the leading speech in the House of Lords, based his argument on the recitals of the 
Directive and the wording of its articles and concluded that the Directive did not confer rights on 
individuals.93  Furthermore, he considered its purpose to be the coordination of the rules on banking 
supervision.  The Paul decision, handed down by the CJEU four years later, showed that the House of 
Lords arrived at the correct conclusion.  The Three Rivers case is chiefly instructive because it 
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revealed a reluctance on part of the House of Lords to refer the question to the CJEU.94  Lord Hope 
concluded that the question was ‘acte clair’ despite having dedicated sixteen page of his judgment 
to that very point and despite the strong dissenting opinion by Auld LJ in the Court of Appeal.95  That 
the question was evidently not acte clair is obvious from the reference in Paul.  The Three Rivers 
decision thus reveals another weakness in the conception of Member State liability as a tool for 
private decentralised enforcement.  Such enforcement can only work where Member State courts 
view EU law remedies in the wider context of enforcement, which would incentivise more 
references to the CJEU in critical cases such as Three Rivers.   
 The criterion that the provision breached must be intended to confer rights on individuals 
has been shown not to be unproblematic.  The main reason for this is the lack of clear guidance from 
the CJEU as to what constitutes a right under EU law.  It is therefore not surprising that the national 
courts have had difficulties in applying this criterion.  Coupled with a lack of enthusiasm for awarding 
state liability damages and for referring borderline cases to the CJEU, this has the potential to 
hamper the suitability of Francovich claims as a means of enforcing European Union law. 
2. Sufficiently serious breach  
The most difficult condition for a claimant to establish is that of a sufficiently serious breach.  The 
main criterion is whether the Member State had any discretion granted to it by EU law when the 
breach was committed.  The more discretion is given to a Member State, the less likely is the 
existence of a sufficiently serious breach.96  The court dealing with the question must, in the CJEU’s 
own famous words, take the following factors into account:  
[…] the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or 
Community authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, 
whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a Community 
institution may have contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or 
practices contrary to Community law.  
On any view, a breach of Community law will clearly be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a 
judgment finding the infringement in question to be established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of 
the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted an infringement.
97
 
In Dillenkofer, the Court held that in cases such as in Francovich, where a Directive has not been 
transposed in time, the breach of EU law is always considered sufficiently serious.98  Outside these 
clear-cut cases, the key question is whether a Member State has manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits of its discretion.99  A decisive factor for this assessment is the clarity and precision of the 
rule infringed.100   
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Generally speaking it is for the national court to assess whether a breach of EU law is 
sufficiently serious.101  The following discussion of German and English cases will show that national 
courts are reluctant to find a sufficiently serious breach.  Only in evident situations like the complete 
failure to transpose a Directive into national law within the transposition period or where, in 
response to a preliminary reference, the CJEU has itself found a sufficiently serious breach will such 
a finding normally be made.102  In other cases the courts will often point to a lack of clarification by 
the CJEU.  There is pattern in both English and German cases that where ‘only’ an incorrect 
transposition of a Directive is at question, courts do not find a sufficiently serious breach unless the 
legal situation had previously been clarified by the CJEU.103  Courts will often rely on the CJEU’s 
decision in British Telecommunications104 in order to argue that the Member State’s error in 
transposing the Directive was excusable.  In particular, they tend to point to a lack of guidance from 
the case-law of the CJEU on the very question.105  It is suggested that this is partly the CJEU’s own 
fault as its case law on the sufficiently serious breach requirement is difficult to follow and lacks 
guidance.  But one can also witness a general unwillingness of national courts to award the remedy.  
The following examples will confirm these findings and will also point out some cases in which the 
national courts reached questionable results suggesting deficient knowledge of European Union law 
and a reluctance to refer borderline cases to the CJEU.   
An obvious misunderstanding of Dillenkofer106 is evident in a decision by the Landgericht 
Düsseldorf concerning the non-implementation of the Working Time Directives 93/104/EC107 and 
2003/88/EC108 by the respondent state of North Rhine Westphalia.109  The Landgericht came to the 
conclusion that this did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach as the content of the Directive 
was not clearly identifiable.  In this case the Landgericht confused the requirement in Francovich 
that the content of the rights contained in a Directive must be identifiable.110  But this is unrelated to 
the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach.  Rather it is a factor for assessing whether the 
Directive confers rights on individuals. 111  It is a logical prerequisite that for a Directive to confer 
rights on individuals, these rights must be identifiable.  Nonetheless the overall denial of a claim in 
state liability by the Landgericht was correct since the plaintiff had failed to try and enforce his 
actual right to work less in the first place so that a national procedural requirement stood in the way 
of success.   
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex p. Gallagher exposes some confusion surrounding the meaning of ‘discretion’ in the 
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British Telecommunications case.112  Gallagher, an Irish citizen, was expelled from the United 
Kingdom by the Home Secretary on grounds of public policy.  Article 9 of Directive 64/221/EEC 
provides that an expulsion on such grounds may only happen after an opinion by a competent 
authority had been obtained before which the person concerned enjoys rights of defence and 
assistance.113  The 1989 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act did not contain such a 
requirement and, accordingly, the Home Secretary never obtained an opinion as provided for by the 
Directive.  The Court of Appeal concluded that, while there was a breach, there had been discretion 
in the implementation of the Directive.  The Court of Appeal admitted that the Directive did not 
leave a large degree discretion to the Member State but that nonetheless it was given some 
discretion.  Regrettably, the Court of Appeal did not specify where that discretion lay.  It is true that, 
as the Court of Appeal had pointed out, the law of state liability was still at a formative stage when 
the decision in Gallagher was handed down.  Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the Court of Appeal 
considered that there was discretion.  The Directive was unambiguous as to the requirement of an 
‘opinion’ prior to expulsion.  The only discretionary decisions to be taken by a Member State 
regarding the opinion would have been the designation of the body responsible for issuing it and by 
which procedure it should be governed.  But this was of no relevance to the question before the 
Court of Appeal.  It was clear that Member States had no discretion as to whether an opinion had to 
be obtained prior to expulsion.  Since the Act did not contain the requirement that an opinion be 
sought prior to expulsion the transposition was obviously incorrect and should have been considered 
a sufficiently serious breach. 
The English High Court’s (Queen’s Bench Division) decision in the case of (R) Negassi v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department confirms that even in seemingly clear cases national 
courts are reluctant to find a sufficiently serious breach where the incorrect transposition of a 
Directive is concerned.114  The case concerned access to work for asylum seekers under Article 11 of 
the Reception Directive 2003/9/EC.115  The applicant, an asylum seeker, had been refused 
permission to work in the United Kingdom as he had previously unsuccessfully applied for asylum 
arguing that Article 11 of the Directive only granted access to work to first applicants.  This 
construction of Article 11 was held to be incorrect.  In determining whether the breach was 
sufficiently serious, the court considered another case decided by the UK Supreme Court where it 
had held that the interpretation of Article 11 was acte clair and therefore no reference to the CJEU 
was necessary.116  Counsel for the applicant argued that as a result the breach of Article 11 was 
sufficiently serious.  The court did not accept this, however.  The judge pointed out that the 
European Commission had very probably been aware of the United Kingdom’s implementation but 
had not done anything about it.  The court accepted that this was a borderline case.  Remarkably it 
held that for this reason there was no sufficiently serious breach and explicitly pointed out that the 
hurdle for an applicant seeking damages is a high one.  This case shows a clear reluctance on part of 
the High Court to find a sufficiently serious breach even though the Supreme Court had considered 
this to be evident.117  Most interesting is its explicit argument that the European Commission had 
been silent on the matter even though it should have been aware of the way in which the United 
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Kingdom had implemented the Directive.  This implies that the court would have expected the 
Commission to initiate proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.  From the fact that the Commission did 
not do so, the High Court appears to have inferred that the breach was not serious.  This line of 
reasoning demonstrates that the High Court clearly did not regard Member State liability as a 
mechanism for the enforcement of EU law, but only as a remedy for the compensation of damage 
suffered by a private party. 
This is confirmed by the German Bundesgerichtshof’s (Federal Court of Justice) decision on 
whether Germany had incorrectly implemented Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.118  Germany excluded 
broadcasters from the distribution of proceeds from a levy on copying appliances and recording 
mediums.  While under German law the reproduction of material is legal for personal use, the 
producers of appliances for making such copies and of mediums for the storage of copies must pay a 
levy, which is then distributed to the producers of works.  Article 2 (e) of the Directive explicitly 
includes broadcasters as rightholders.  Article 5 provides for exceptions to the rightholder’s right to 
exploit their work, but any exception must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder.  It is difficult to understand how the Bundesgerichtshof came to the conclusion that a 
blanket exclusion of a whole group of rightholders from the distribution of the levy could come 
within this narrow exception.  The court further argued that even if this were not the case, a breach 
would not be sufficiently serious.  On the face of it a blanket exclusion appears to unreasonably 
prejudice the interests of broadcasters and would therefore constitute a clear breach of the 
Directive.  This case shows that the Bundesgerichtshof was both unwilling to find a sufficiently 
serious breach and to make a reference to the CJEU for a clarification of the matter.   
This brief survey of the case law regarding the sufficiently serious breach requirement shows 
a pattern that courts are unlikely to find a sufficiently serious breach in cases, which deal with the 
incorrect implementation or application of EU law.  Only where there was a failure to transpose a 
Directive in time or where the CJEU had previously established a breach will such a finding be made.  
This is coupled with a conspicuous reluctance to make preliminary references in borderline cases, 
which are instead decided in favour of the Member State.  
3. Causation and national procedural hurdles 
The CJEU does not normally give guidance on the national courts’ decision regarding the 
requirement of a causal link between the breach and the damage119.  This is because it is usually a 
question of fact.120  As shown in the above table, a number of cases have failed in the national courts 
because the alleged damage was not caused by the breach.  In the case of Negassi discussed above, 
the High Court made the additional argument that the applicant would not have found work in the 
United Kingdom even if the Directive had been applied correctly.121   Surprisingly, the judge did not 
forward any evidence for this but based it on a mere assumption that no work would have been 
available for the applicant.  The follow-up to the CJEU’s Danske Slagterier decision122 by the 
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Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) Köln is also instructive.123  Germany had violated its 
obligations under several Directives regarding the importation of pork stemming from non-castrated 
male pigs and rejected numerous consignments of pork from Denmark.124  Danske Slagterier, an 
association of Danish slaughterhouses, thus claimed damages because Germany had seriously 
breached EU law.  After a reference to the CJEU had been made, the Bundesgerichtshof , which had 
referred the case to the CJEU, handed the case back to the Oberlandesgericht Köln for further fact-
finding.  The Oberlandesgericht found against Danske Slagterier because the alleged damage was not 
caused by Germany’s breach of the EU Directive at issue since the plaintiff was unable to proof that 
the reduction in the production of pork from uncastrated male pigs was caused by the illegal 
German behaviour.  This is because the decision to reduce the production of that meat been decided 
before the Directive entered into force.  Thus it was not caused by failure to transpose it.  A similar 
argument was made by the same court in one of the cases following Dillenkofer.125  It is recalled that 
the claimants in Dillenkofer were holiday makers stranded in their holiday destinations after their 
travel operator had gone insolvent.  Germany had transposed the Package Holiday Directive 
90/314/EEC126 late so that they were not covered by the protection provided for, which included 
security of repatriation.  In the case before the Oberlandesgericht the package holiday contract in 
question had been concluded before the transposition period for the package travel directive had 
expired so that it would not have been covered by it even if a timely transposition had taken place.  
The survey of case law conducted for this study has not been able to establish a difference in the 
approach to causation between German and English courts.  This is perhaps due to the relative 
simplicity of state liability claims when it comes to causation.   
Restrictions on the state liability claim based on national procedural rules, such as the 
domestic rules on procedure, evidence, limitation, and the calculation of damages, are also in the 
domain of the domestic courts.  The only proviso is that that they are not less favourable than those 
applying to similar claims under domestic law (equivalence) and not so framed as to make it 
impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation (effectiveness).127  Naturally, procedural rules 
differ from Member State to Member State so that two comparable claims in two different Member 
States may see different outcomes.  For instance, the limitation period for state liability claims in 
Germany is three years whereas it is six years in England.128  While the case law on the matters of 
causation and national procedural rules is not overly instructive, it is nonetheless important to bear 
in mind that in particular differences in national procedure can severely affect the suitability of 
Member State liability for the enforcement of EU law.129   
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IV. Conclusions 
This article has aimed to test the assumption that the remedy of Member State liability for 
infringements of European Union law first introduced by the CJEU in Francovich should be regarded 
as a mechanism for the private enforcement of European Union law.  A statistical analysis of 
decisions by English and German courts revealed that not many Francovich claims have been 
brought so far and that very few have been successful.  Of course, these results must be taken with a 
pinch of salt given the limitations of this study.  The results only concern two Member States and 
cannot therefore reliably predict the situation in other Member States.  It is submitted that in view 
of the low number of preliminary references from other Member States, except perhaps Italy, it is 
likely that the situation in those other Member States does not differ greatly.  Yet more 
comprehensive research, which includes all Member States, would certainly be welcome.130  In 
addition, it would be worthwhile examining the disciplining effect, which the possibility of a state 
liability claim may or may not have on the Member States when it comes to the implementation of 
Directives in particular.  An internal guide on the transposition of Directives by the British 
Department for Business warns of legal challenges in national courts in cases of incorrect 
implementation, explicitly referring to Member State liability.131  This suggests that the British 
government was aware of the potential costs which Francovich claims may result in.  Interestingly, 
the latest version of this guide no longer makes reference to the danger of Francovich claims.132  
Moreover, Member States still regularly violate their duty to transpose Directives in time, so that the 
deterring effect (if it exists) of such claims is often outweighed by the benefits which a government 
may believe late transposition may have.133 
 Both the statistical findings and the analysis of court decisions made in this article suggest 
that Member State liability is not a successful means of enforcing European Union law.  The reasons 
for this can be summarised as follows.  The overall number of Francovich claims in the national 
courts of England and Germany remains low.  Over the past twenty years, there were fewer than 
two cases per year on average in each of these legal systems and the success rate remains relatively 
low.  Even if one takes into account, as Granger has convincingly suggested, that there was an initial 
reluctance by applicants to seek and by courts to award the new and unfamiliar remedy, it would 
need a significant rise in applications in the future to make a difference.134   
 The second part of this article attempted to answer the question why Member State liability 
is so rarely successful.  It is suggested that a number of factors come into play, on the basis of which 
the limits of Member State liability as a private enforcement mechanism can be shown.  The 
conditions for state liability set by the CJEU are very hard to satisfy and have not been clearly 
defined by the Court.  This is coupled with the decentralised nature of Francovich proceedings.  In 
addition, there is no evidence that Member State courts have taken the private enforcement aspect 
of Member State liability on board and regard themselves as EU courts.135  To the contrary, one can 
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witness a reluctance to make requests for preliminary references in borderline cases, which would 
be necessary for effective enforcement to work.  Furthermore, national courts will generally decide 
borderline cases in favour of the state.  For these reasons, the attempt to empower citizens to 
enforce EU law by giving them a remedy in state liability has not been very successful.136  The 
findings in this study confirm an earlier study conducted by Slepcevic on the possibilities and limits of 
private enforcement of compliance with the Natura 2000 Directives.137  He concluded that access to 
the courts and a common interpretation by the national courts are two crucial factors for successful 
enforcement.138  In state liability proceedings, access to the remedy is severely limited by the strict 
legal requirements set up by the CJEU.  Furthermore, the interpretation of EU law by national courts 
is not always uniform, a situation for which the CJEU is itself partly to blame.  Undoubtedly, 
however, Francovich is a successful tool for individual compensation.  Where complainants have 
managed to establish the conditions and got around limitations laid down in domestic law, such as 
limitation periods, their claims will be successful.  This can be seen in the case of Dillenkofer in the 
aftermath of which more than 7000 claims were settled as well as in the case of Factortame, where 
a number of companies were able to secure compensation.  One can also conclude from some of the 
cases following in the footsteps of Fuß that many individuals have been able to obtain compensation 
on the basis of this judgment.   
 It is thus submitted that one should reconsider conceptualising Member State liability as a 
mechanism for the enforcement of European Union law.  It should instead be regarded as a remedy 
first and foremost for individuals.  While Tallberg’s analysis that the Member States have 
emasculated Member State liability could be regarded as an exaggeration139, the same must be said 
of Albers-Llorens’ designation of Member State liability as the ‘ultimate indirect mechanism to 
secure Member States’ compliance’.140  It is thus suggested to turn Caranta’s early analysis quoted in 
the introduction to this article on its head.141   Rather than regarding individual judicial protection in 
such cases as incidental, private enforcement ought to be regarded as no more than an implication 
of the remedy providing compensation for individual claimants where they happen to fulfil the strict 
requirements laid down by the Court of Justice.  
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